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The Nature of Mass Art 
Noel Carroll 
I. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a conceptual analysis of the notion 
of mass art. That is, my aim is to produce a philosophical theory that 
isolates the common structural and functional features that enable us co 
group assorted films, TV programs, photographs, ads, songs, pulp novels, 
fiction magazines, and so on under the rubric of mass art. 
Mass art has been with us, to a certain extent, since the invention of 
the printing press. But it has become increasingly omnipresent with the 
advent and the expansion of the industrial revolution due to the creation 
of new technologies for the mass distribution of pictures, stories, songs, etc. 
Moreover, in the so-called postindustrial age, the electronic means for 
disseminating art have been further augmented to the point where it 
becomes conceivable that we will soon reach - if we have not already 
reached - an historical juncture where almost no human being will be 
able to escape at least some exposure to mass art. 
Mass art - at least in the statistical sense - is the most dominant art 
of our times. As such, it should command the attention of philosophers of 
an. My purpose in writing chis paper is to say something about the nature 
of this art, especially as it crystallized in the throes of the industrial 
revolution and as it continues to develop into the age of electronic 
reproduction. Though I think that my proposals do pertain, in many ways, 
to the forms of mass art that attend the rise of the printing press, my theory 
is particularly attuned to mass art as it emerges in the industrial revolution 
and as it evolves in our own information age. Roughly stated, the exten­
sion of the items that I intend my theory to capture includes: popular, 
commercial films, TV, commercial photography, pop music, broadcast 
radio, computer video games, comic strips, pu[p literature and the Like. 
Though I have just asserted that philosophers of art should be inter­
ested in mass art, it is not the case that they have been. Indeed, through­
out the period of the ascendancy of mass art, most philosophers of art have 
either ignored mass art or have been outright hostile to it - demoting it to 
the rank of either kitsch or pseudo-art. This resistance to mass art crosses 
philosophical traditions and can be found in the disparate theories of R.G. 
Collingwood,1 Jose Oretega Y Gasset,2 T.W. Adorno (sometimes in 
collaboration with Max Horkheimer)3 and art theorist/critics like Clive 
Bell� and Clement Greenberg.5 
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Philosophy's resistance to mass art has been, as I have argued else, 
where,6 the result of the tendency of Western aeschetics co misconscrue 
Kane's analysis of free beauty, as advanced in his Cntique of ]u.dgmeru.- as a 
theory of art. Among ocher things, that theory identifies free beauty v.ith 
the active response to phenomena for their own sake - phenomena that, 
in cum, are not subsumable under a concept or a purpose. For Kant, the 
response co beauty is a free, spontaneous, cognitively constructive response 
that eschews aJI rules and formulas, and that appreciates the stimulus for 
its uniqueness and paniculariry, independently of morality and inclination. 
Kant, of course, was writing about beauty - about our appreciation of 
things lik.e flowers and the markings of animals. But what seems to have 
happened in European aesthetics after Kant is that Kant's. account of free 
beauty - as opposed to his account of dependent beauty - came to be seen 
as proposing a theory of art and art appreciation. This is, of course, ironic 
since it is in fact Kant's account of dependent beauty that would appear co 
offer an account of art as we standardly conceive of it, whereas the 
account of free beauty does a much better job of tracking some of our 
typical responses to nature. 
The form that this confusion over our Kantian heritage took was to 
regard artworks, properly so.-called, as objects and performances that were 
designed to bring about aesthetic experiences in spectators, where aes, 
thetic experiences, in tum, as characterized in the way that Kant charac, 
terized experiences of free beauty. That is, artworks proper are character, 
ized in terms of their capacity to engender in audiences active cognitive 
experiences of appreciation, marked by freedom, for objects chat are not 
subsumable under formulas, rules, concepts or purposes, and which yield 
pleasure in the object for its own sake, independently of moral or emotional 
factors. 
I will not belabor the ways in which this is an inadequate theory of art. 
The point I wish to emphasize is that if philosophers of art harbor - if only 
subconsciously - something like this view of art proper, then they will have 
no way of coming to terms with mass art. They will observe, with some 
j1ustice, that mass art is formulaic; that, in certain pertinent respects, the 
response to mass art is passive; that mass art is often designed and appreci .. 
ated not for its own sake, but to induce predetermined emotional experi, 
ences (e.g., tear .. jerkers) and to advance moral views; that works of mass 
art are often not striking for their uniqueness. and particularity; that mass 
art neither elicits the free play of the faculties nor does it obviously border 
on any other realm of freedom; and so on. 
Furthermore and consequently, armed with a misconstrual of Kant and 
the preceding observations, the philosopher of art is apt to conclude that 
mass art is not really art at all. Thus, mass art either falls outside the 
purview of the philosopher of art, or, if mass art becomes an object of 
theory, it does so only insofar as the philosopher of art undertakes to 
explain why mass art is pseudo,art. 
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rruscon [rual of Kam. explain \\ hv so mam· ph1l0f pht:r� and ch�)rucs t"li 
art - mcludmg Collmgwood, Adornv. Horkhe1mer, Green�rg. Bdl. 
Dwight MacDonald' and others - ha\'e either ignored m•r� an c.)r demoted 
1c co che po mon of p�eudo,arc. Of cour e . . m1 e of the cheon�cs I ha\'e ju r 
mennoned would argue chat rhev ha\'e exphc1cl ·departed from Kane tn 
many of their \\Titmg . Bue in re pon e. I claim chat m their arguments 
with re pecc co ma arc. they implicicly re\'err ro the nu appropriation of 
Kaneian cheory pre\'iou 1 · ketched. Thar phtlo opher. and cheorisr� from 
different traditions hould con\'erge on the ame mi take hould, of cour�e. 
come as no surpri e, since Kane is pr babl ·the la c philo�opher whom the 
various traditions of Western philosophy hare in common. 
If my diagnosis i correct, then the widespread failure of philo ophical 
aesthetics with respect co mas arc in\'olve the frequent assumption of a 
framework - call it the er at: Kantian theory of art - chat is not only a 
controversial (indeed, I would say discredited) theory of arc but which -
more importantly for our purpo e - is categorically inho pirable co ma 
art. For the ersatz Kantian theory of art precludes from the out et the 
possibility that mass arc is art and. therefore, a pre· ing object of attention 
for the philosophy of art. The ersat:: Kantian theory of art is blind,sided 
when it comes to mass art; it lacks the conceptual resource to characteri:e 
the nature of mass art as it is because its subcon cious philosophical 
conceptual framework was designed to track something else. 
At the risk of sounding presumptuous, my aim in this paper is to begin 
to redress the failure of the philosophical tradition to come ro terms with 
mass arc. I intend to offer a theory of mass art as it is, rather than a polemic 
about what it should or should not be. But, of course, even this apparently 
simple statement of purpose is fraught with difficulties. One of chose 
difficulties is the very way in which I have chosen to articulate my task. 
For I have called my object of study mass an. Others have adopted alter, 
native labels, including popular art, low art, kitsch, lowbrow arc, the 
popular, and so on. Nor are these alternative labels merely matters of con, 
venience. Many practitioners of what is coming to be called cultural studies. 
like Andrew Ross,9 Patrick Brantlinger10 and John Fiske, 11 regard mass art 
as a suspect, if not spurious concept, preferring the notions of popular art 
or the popular as the most helpful ones for surveying the field. Thus, in the 
process of developing my theory of mass art, I will also need to provide 
arguments in favor of dominating the field of inquiry in the way that I do. 
This paper has three parts. The first part concerns an examination and 
refutation of a recent philosophical theory of what I call mass art. This 
view might be called 'The Elimination Theory of Mass Art." Advanced by 
the philosopher David Novitz12, but also, I believe reflected in the theories 
of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, 13 "The Elimination Theory" maintains 
that there really is no such thing as popular or mass arc, apart form the role 
certain objects play in reinforcing pre-existing social class distinctions and 
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identities. That is, chere are no formal or structural feacure , nor are chere 
any distinguishing affective consequences that might erve to differentiate 
popular or mass art from high arc. Since my theory claim that there are 
structural and functional features that idencify mass art, 'The Elimination 
Theory" is a rival to my view, one whose skepticism I need to undermine 
before I advance my own theory. 
The second part of this paper develops my theory of ma s art. The aim 
of this section is primarily definitional. though I will attempt to suggest 
some broad hypotheses for empirical research char my theory encourages. 
The last part of the paper entertains some of the objections to my 
approach that I anticipate might be leveled by proponents of cultural 
studies. Specifically, I will address John Fiske's assertion char there is no 
such thing as mass culture. For, of course. if Fiske is right, then my project 
looks like it is doomed from the start. So I will conclude by arguing that 
Fiske's position is simply indefensible. 
II. The Elimination Thwry of Mass Art 
In a recent article entitled "Ways of Artmaking: The High And The 
Popular In Art, "14 David Novitz argues that there are no formal features 
that distinguish popular art from high art. is nor are there any recurring 
affective features to do the job either. Rather, he writes: "What begins to 
emerge is that the distinction between high art and popular art does not 
merely distinguish different types of art, but, much more than this. it 
actually accentuates and reinforces traditional class distinctions in 
society .1117 And he concludes " ... the distinction between the high arts and 
the popular arcs cannot be wholly located in the intrinsic qualities or 
affective dimensions of the work itself."18 
Despite the sudden qualification - "cannot be wholly" - in Novitz's 
conclusion (a qualification to which I will return), the thrust of Novitz's 
argument is that the distinction between popular art and high art rests not 
on any formal or structural difference between the two, but is merely a 
device through which society, notably industrialized Western society, 
elaborates pre�existing class distinctions in terms of putative differences in 
taste. I stress putative here because Novitz: does not bdieve that these 
supposed differences in taste are based on anything other than a somewhat 
arbitrary association of certain objects with certain classes. Moreover, 
though Novitz does not mention the work of Pierre Bourdieu, it is easy to 
see how Novicz's philosophical arguments about the il[usory status of the 
distinction between high art and popular art might procure some mileage 
from Bourdieu's studies of taste cultures.19 
Novitz does not speak explicitly in terms of "mass art." He prefers the 
idiom of "popular art." Nevertheless, it seems to me chat he is talking 
about mass arc. For he dates the emergence of what he calls popular art in 
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che ninereench cenrurv. and hi mrroducror" IL r (paradigmatic example· 
of popular art includes "many (alrhough n t all) film-. popular romance , 
television programs and che advertisement" that fund chem. a� wdl a 
comic trip , maga_-ine , erotica and rock mu� ic .... "�,-Thu·, if 1 <.Wit:- thinks 
chat there are no distinguishing mark of popular an of this sore, he mu�t 
be committed co che view iliac there are no disnnguish1ng mark� of what I 
call mass art. No,·it:'· argumenr i a debunking argument. It proceeds by 
challenging an as orrment of way of acrempting to negotiate the du tinc­
tion between high arr and popular art in accordance with ome principle. 
He conclude chat there is no principled way of drawing the distinction. 
But he maintains that there must neverthele-s be some explanati n of the 
distinction. That is, even if the distinction is illusory, we mu t still account 
for why we suffer the illusion. So, under the pre sure of producing uch an 
account, Novitz explains that the theoretically insubscanrial distinction 
between high art and popular persist as pare of an overall ystem of cla · 
distinctions; it serves to mark off an elite cla s from presumably eYervbod 1 
else. Moreover, chis explanation debunks the distinction in question 
insofar as it implies that the only way that someone could come to uphold 
ic is through a commitmenit to a suspect ideological social arrangement. 
In order to advance his explanation, Novitz has to show that there are 
no principled distinctions to be drawn between high art and popular arc. 
This involves demonstrating thac che bases upon which we are prone to 
draw distinctions between high art and popular arc all collapse under the 
most meager scrutiny. 
What are some of the bases for distinguishing high arc from popular art? 
The four that Novitz examines are: 1) differences in form, e.g., high an is 
complex whereas popular arc is simple; 2) differences in affect, e.g, high art 
deals in profound, deep and nuanced emotion, whereas the formulas of 
popular art arouse tired and commonplace emotions; 3) differences in 
origin, e.g., high art is produced by individuals involved in adventures of 
self-discovery, whereas popular art is produced collaboratively or even 
corporately; 4) differences in motive: i.e., high art, with its celebration of 
disinterestedness, is produced in opposition to capitalism's reduction of all 
value to market value, whereas popular art is a creature of the marketplace. 
Clearly, none of these distinctions can withstand che slightest historical 
pressure. Some high art is simple, described in terms like "elegance," 
whereas, by many measures of complexity, popular art can be complex: The 
Hunt for Red October and T enninator 2 are technically complex, whereas 
Twin Peaks is structurally complex. Moreover, high art - for example the 
religious art of the middle ages - was predicated upon instilling the 
commonplace devotional attitudes of the age, 21 whereas a TV drama like 
Marry explores some emotions with subtlety. Novitz takes it that a barrage 
of counterexamples like this establish that there are no reasonable grounds 
for believing that popular art has any distinguishing formal or affective 
properties. 22 
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Likewise, the thought that high art is co popular art� works of indi­
vidual genius are co corporate productions can be ea ily dispelled. Bailee 
and opera - putatively high art - are often no le collaborative than 
commercial fiJmmaking or network TV, wh1le some Hollywood produc­
tions - the works of Hitchcock come ro mind here - bear the stamp of 
the individual artist. Nor can the relation of high an to che marketplace 
drive a wedge between it and popular culture. Are Julian Schnabel and 
David Salle less attuned to the siren call of money than Steven Spielberg 
and Frank Sinatra? ?J 
Formalizing Noviu's argument, it looks like this: 
I) The distinction between high art and popular art is based 
upon either: a) a difference in formal structure, b) a difference 
in affective propenies, c) a difference in origin (i.e., a differ­
ence of  personal, individual creation versus corporate or 
collaborative creation), d) a distinction in motive, or e) a 
matter of class differentiation. 
2) The distinction between high an and popular art cannot be 
based on a), b), c) or d). (This premise is motivated by the 
preceding counterexamples). 
3) Therefore, the distinction between high art and popular arc 
is based on e) a matter of class differentiation. 
Moreover, it seems that the way that we are to understand this conclu­
sion is to regard high art as marker of membership in the elite. Popular art 
is the badge of the rest of us. 
However, understanding the conclusion in this way, of  course, already 
suggests that there is something wrong here. High arc, at least in contem­
porary America, doesn't really seem to funcrtion as an emblem of member­
ship in the dominant social classes. Not only does George Bush avow a 
love of country and western music, but popular art, statistically, is probably 
the art that most of our elite consume while, at the same time, the largest 
portion of our elite are suspicious of contemporary high art. 
Obviously, an interest in consuming or making contemporary high art 
requires a degree of education, but that is readily available to anyone of 
any class who attends college and, of course, the background can be 
acquired autodidactically without attending the university. A roster of 
contemporary artists and critics quickly reveals that allegiance to the 
practices of high art do not depend on social background - though 
admittedly being in the upper middle class or the middle class may make 
such allegiance more probable - while, at the same time, a taste for 
popular art and an aversion to high art seems to cut across class lines. 
Novitz's account of the social function of the high art/popular art distinc-
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non can't be nght. ac lease in the Amencan concexc. �caus.e it ts fuLe that 
class dl!itmcnon map onco the high art popular arc d1srmcuon m the ,,.a,· 
char �one:' account require�. if Lt L� co be an explananon of the di.nnc­
non.·' 
Indeed, from the newpomt of social cheorv. chere L� something obvi-
t)U Ly rrained about dindmg our society into rwo <."'ICtal cla e - the elite 
an<l everyone else - and then mappmg the high arc popular art disrinc­
rion onco th LS d1\'is1on. Cleark, there are more ·ial di vi ·ion than the e 
rwo and, though there are probabl 1 important relation between ome 
ocial affiliation and artistic con umption. it mu t be far more complex 
than the binary picture of society and of arrmaking chat ovit: propo es. 15 
Novitz's account of the social function chat the high art/popular art 
distinction plays simply cannoc be correct because our societ)' cannot 
plausibly be taken to be structured in the way he presumes. and. therefore, 
che distinction amongst the arts thac concerns him cannot be regarded as 
mirroring a binary structure rhat does not exist. 
Our objections to Novitz here are efficiently summari:ed by Russell A. 
Berman, who writing in another context. notes that: 
It is not immediately obvious chat the social and political 
elites consrirure the primary recipients of "high culture" - is it 
really the case that high income means high art, that Ted 
Kennedy and George Bush prefer Arnold Schoenberg to 
Wayne Newton? Nor is it self-evident that appreciation of 
high art is undeniable evidence of high social standing. While 
there is probably some connection between social status and 
aesthetic caste, it is simultaneously more flexible and more 
complex than can be encompassed by a simplistic doubling of 
the vertical metaphor of high and low from society to art. 26 
In terms of Novitz's argument, then, I am, in effect, denying char e) is a 
live option. The distinction must rest on something other than matters of 
class distinction. This suggests two ways in whiclh Novitz's argument may 
have gone wrong: first, certain of the options that the argument rejects 
may have been dismissed coo hastily; second, there may be other bases for 
the distinction that Novitz has overlooked. In fact, I think that Novitz's 
argument errs in both these directions. 
It seems obvious that Novitz's dismissal of the possibility of some formal 
differentiae between high art and popular art is too quick. He considers 
only one possible formal distinction - in terms of simplicity - and he 
rejects the prospects of any formal distinction in short order. But surely it is 
a mistake to jump from the notion that simplicity won't do the job to 
conclude that there are no formal features that are characteristic of 
popular art. 
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Indeed, if there were no formal differences between high an and 
popular aJ4 it would, at least, be difficult co see how the disrincrion could 
serve the social role ovitz attribute co ic. How would the elire be able ro 
identify which objects were the right one "·irh which to affiliate or 
disaffiliate? Moreover, if it were perfectly arbitrary - if high art was 
whatever some suitably defined elite consumes - then we would ex.peer ro 
find that the class of high art objects would be just as likely co contain 
Garbage Pail Kids trading cards and Care Bears paraphenalia as it does 
works by Anselm Kiefer. Bue the sec of works of high arc is noc such a 
hodgepodge. 
In face, how could ic be if ic was to serve as a stable means for differenri, 
acing classes? Thar is, if people, at least in part, emblematize their social 
identity through their exercises in taste, they would have co have some 
way of determining whether they were attending co the right sort of things. 
And formal differences seem a very likely candidate here for determining 
whether something is a matter of high or popular arc. 
Maybe, Novitz virtually concedes as much. With respect to conrempo, 
rary high art, he writes chat it "is the formal, learned and 'difficult' art 
which has the attention of the cultured and educated elite." But aren't 
"formal," "learned" and '"difficult" differentiating features? In fact, 
shouldn't they count as formal properties chat disnnguish high art in the 
epoch in which the high art/popular art distinction takes hold? But, then, 
Novitz's argument has surely dispensed with the possibility that there are 
formal differentiae between high art and popular art prematurely. 
Perhaps Novitz is aware of this flaw in his argument. Earlier, I noted 
chat he concludes that the high arts cannot wholly be distinguished from 
the popular arcs in terms of the formal, intrinsic qualities of works. This 
qualification - cannot wholly - would appear to contradict his previous 
assertions that there are no formal differentiae between high art and 
popular art. Moreover, this sudden qualification allows that the distinction 
may, in part, have something to do with formal differentiae. Thus, Novitz 
may have rejected the role of formal differences in the high art/popular art 
distinction too quickly. In the next section of this essay, I will explore the 
possibility of developing formal distinctions in ways that will not only 
forestall Novicz's argument, but will put us on the road to defining mass art. 
However, before evolving this line of argumentation any further, let me 
remind you of another shortcoming in Novitz's argument. Novitz's case 
takes the form of a disjunctive syllogism - an argument by eliminacion of 
all the competing alternatives. An argument of this sort depends upon 
successfully setting forth all the competing alternatives. If  Novitz has failed 
to consider all the alternatives, his argument is inconclusive. Futhermore, I 
think that he has failed to countenance all the relevant alternatives for 
drawing the distinction that concerns him. 
In order to see the alternative that I think Novitz has overlooked, it is 
useful to recall that Novitz calls the phenomenon at hand popular an, 
9
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whereas I call ir mass art. "Popular art" can be a \·ery ahiscorical concept. 
Arguably. in some sense. some high arttpopular art distinctkm C<lll be 
marshaled to apply co many different cultures and historical eras. Maybe 
this is why Novlit: is tempted to draw his counterexamples from such 
widely diverging sources as medie\·al arc and the movies. 
But che cenaal question is whether our contemporary debates about 
mass art and popular art are best understood in light of an eternal contrast 
between che high and the popular or, rather, are best understood in che 
concrete historical context of the rise of what Walter Benjamin called the 
age of mechanical reproduction!; which, nowadays, is becoming the age of 
electronic reproduction? That is, the concerns chat motivate contemporary 
cheoretical discussions aboulC the popular arts occur in a hislorical con.text 
where we understand that the label "popular an" discursively refers to the 
arts of mechanical and electronic reproduction. 
When pundits decry the plight of culture in industrial and so,called 
postindustrial society, they are not referring to che probable, pernicious 
effects of medieval miracle plays. They are talking about the art that is 
disseminated by mass technologies. Moreover, Novitz himself means to be 
talking about this historically situated phenomenon, as we can see by 
attending the lists he draws up of examples of popular art; as well as by his 
claim chat the relevant high art/popular art distinction only arises in the 
ninete.enth century. That is, when Novitz and other theoreticians talk 
about popular art, they are, in general, talking about what I call mass art­
art produced and distributed on a mass scale. 
Bue what does this point about the historically specific referent of the 
notion of popular arc have to do wich my claim that Novitz may have 
overlooked a crucial alternative way of distinguishing high art from 
popular art in his argument? Namely this: there may indeed be certain 
structural differences between mass arc - che art distributed by mass 
technologies - and other sorts of art which contribute in part co the 
distinction that Novitz's argument aspires to reject. In order to make good 
on this possibility, let me turn directly to the project of defining mass art. 
ill. Defining Mass Art 
I have promised to propose a theory of the nature of mass art. By claiming 
that this theory pertains to the nature of mass art, I contend that it is 
concerned with classifying mass art, rather than either condemning or 
commending it. This is meant to distinguish my approach from many 
previous theories of mass art which seem to be preoccupied with evaluat, 
ing mass art either morally, politically or aesthetically. Guy Debord,28 
Dwight Macdonald, Collingwood, Adorno, Greenberg, Horkheimer and 
Jean Baudrillard, 29 it seems to me, provide characterizations of mass art 
primarily in order to condemn it; while, to a certain extent, Walter 
10
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Benjamin and, more obviously, Marshal �cCiuhanJC present theorie meant 
to valorize 1t. I, on the other hand, hope merely to say what it is - to 
classify mass art rather than t0 judge it morally, politicallv, or aesthetically. 
Funhermore, unlike No\ritz and Bourdieu, I maintain that we can av 
something substantive about the nature of mass art. We need not reduce it 
to something else - e.g., a marker of class relations. Mas art, on my 
understanding, has certain features - incemal fearuries - that lead us to 
classify it as mass arr. That is, something is not mass art simply in virtue of 
external features li1'e what specific social class consumes it. 
Part of the key to characterizing mass art is co realize che importance 
that the word mass plays in naming it. For, as noted previously, there are 
other candidates for naming the phenomenon in question. But, I contend 
that many of them are misleading. Perhaps the most misleading way co 
name the phenomenon is to call it popular art. 
For, as I noted in my criticisms of Novitz, calling the phenomenon 
popular art fails to signal that the type of production that concerns us has a 
certain historical specificity. Popular art, in some sense, might be said to 
have existed throughout the centuries. It is not historically specific. If by 
popular art one means the art of the common people, then there has 
always been what is called folk art. Moreover, if popular art just means art 
that is liked by lots of people, then it seems fair to say that every society 
has had its popular art. 
But, on the other hand, most of the theories of popular art with which 
we are familiar regard the phenomenon in question - whatever it is called 
- as representing some kind of historical break. And if what I've just said 
about the universal connotations of "popular art" is accurate, then that 
notion doesn't highlight the historical specificity of the phenomenon. 
The phenomenon in question emerges in a historical context -
modem, industrial, mass society. It is art that is designed to serve that 
society, and it uses the means of that society - mass technologies - as a 
way of performing its services. 
Precisely dating the emergence of this social formation and of dating 
the correlative emergence of mass art would be difficult. But we can speak 
in a general way. Mass society begins to emerge in tandem with capitalism, 
urbanization and industrialization. Mass art undoubtedly makes some sort 
of initial appearance with the first mass information technology- the 
printing press - which augurs some of the first, potentially mass art forms, 
such as the novel. But, then, later forms of mass art begin to command a 
more and more dominant position in especially industrialized societies in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as more and more mass informa .. 
tion technologies are developed - such as photography, sound recording, 
motion pictures, radio, 1V and so on. Though we might not be able to 
specify the date when the age of mass art dawns, we can certainly say, by 
now, that we are in the thick of it. 
As I noted earlier, a number of cultural theorists, like Andrew Ross and 
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Patrick Brantlinger, shun the label mass art. In tead rhey prefer to con­
tinue ro call the phenomenon popular art. Their motivation, if I under­
stand it properly, is that the label mass has unsavory political connotations. 
For when people Like Dwight MacDonaldu called the phenomenon mass 
art. the term reeked with disdain - notably the disdain of an elitist, 
undemocratic son, a disdain that regards those who do not belong to some 
mandarin company of intellectuals and aestheres as pare of a shapeless blob. 
This shapeless blob - th.e masses - is, according to theorists like 
MacDonald, easily given shape and manipulated by the technocrats of 
popular culture. Moreover, this supposedly shapeless blob is comprised, 
first and foremost, of the working classes or the underclass. Thus, people, 
in what is now called cultural studies, worry that, in speaking of mass art, 
mass culture or mass anything, one is buying inco an elitist view of society. 
Undoubtedly, it is true that the term "mass culture" may have been 
given a contemptuous spin by theorists like Dwight MacDonald. However, 
when I use the term mass art, I do not intend any derogation of its consum­
ers. I simply mean that it is art that is made on a mass scale, i.e., art that is, 
first of all, made by a mass technology. It is made for mass consumption. 
But, here, mass is used in a strictly numerical sense. It is not used in the· 
pejorative - "shapeless blobn - sense. Nor are the numerical masses that 
I have in mind reducible to the masses in the class sense - i.e., to the 
proletariat, to the working class, to blue collar workers, to the lumpen­
proletariat or co the underclass. Mass art is designed to seek out a mass 
audience, irrespective of class. Moreover, mass art succeeds in great 
measure in this endeavor. People of different classes and incomes -
indeed, of altogether different cultures - consume it, as is evinced by the 
distribution of television sets across class and ethnic lines in much of the 
industrialized West, and beyond. 
My sense of mass art is simply numerical, not pejorative. Mass art is art 
that is designed to be consumed by lots and lots of people. That is why it is 
produced on such a large scale and distributed by mass technologies. Thus, 
I am willing to run the risk of calling the phenomenon mass art, despite the 
potentially, politically incorrect sound of the label because: first, it points 
to the significant feature of the phenomenon- that it is essentially one 
that involves a mass scale - and, second, because the alternative way of 
naming it - calling it popular art - fails to acknowledge the way in which 
scale is relevant to its nature and, in consequence, to its historical specific­
ity as a product of industrial, urban, mass society. 
Mass art is art for mass consumption. The first and most obvious way in 
which it is art for mass consumption is that it is produced and distributed 
by mass media- radio, TV, photography, cinema, sound recording, etc. 
As Walter Benjamin pointed out, it is art that can be mass reproduced and 
transported; or, in some cases, it is beamed across great distances so that it 
can engage large numbers of consumers in different places, often simulta­
neously. 
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Vaudeville, as practiced in lace nineteenth cenrurv theater . wa a 
popular an, but not yet a mass art, because the \'audenlle performer could 
only play before one audience of limited i.:e. in one playhou e at a time. 
On the other hand, when vaudeville and mu tc hall performer like 
Charlie Chaplin, Buster Keaton, Harry Langdon and W .C. Field incorpo­
rated their stage routines inro their films, their performance became ma 
art, insofar as their performances became available to mass audiences all 
over the world, at the same cime. 
Many popular arts, like vaudeville, provide the basis for mass arc. How­
ever, not every popular an or entertainment gets transformed into mass an 
by being produced and distributed by a mass medium. Bearbairing, for 
example, doesn't seem to have been transformed into a mass entertainment. 
One mark of whether something is an instance of mass art is that it is 
produced and distributed by means of a mass technology, a technology, for 
example, that has the capacity for mass reproducibility and transportabil­
ity. However, not every artwork that is produced by or disseminated by a 
mass technology is a case of mass arc. That an instance of mass art be 
produced and distributed by a mass technology is merely a necessary 
condition for membership in the class. 
But that something is produced and distributed by a mass technology is 
not enough co guarantee that a candidate is an example of mass art. For an 
artwork may be produced and distributed by a mass technology at the same 
time that it is not designed for mass consumption. 
How is this possible? Well, for example, avant-garde art, that is nor 
designed for mass consumption, can be produced and distributed by a mass 
medium. That is, avant-garde art that is expressly designed to frustrate 
mass consumption - to, for instance, outrage the bourgeoisie - has been 
produced in and distributed by mass media. Consider Cocteau's Blood of 
the Poet. Produced and distributed by the same technology that produced 
and distributed Frank Capra's films, Cocteau's film is not mass art - i.e., is 
not art designed for mass consumption. 
Similar cases can be multiplied with respect to avant,garde music. 
Works by Elliott Carter and Meredith Monk are produced and distributed 
by means of the same technologies of sound recording that are employed in 
producing and distributing the work of Whitney Houston and Madonna. 
Indeed, every mass medium has supported avant,garde experimentation. 
TV has Nam June Paik, and avant .. garde radio broadcast has the German 
poet Schu[dt and the American Richard Kostelanetz.32 
Something can be produced and delivered by means of a mass technol­
ogy, but not be designed for mass consumption, e.g., the avant-garde. 
Here, the pertinent reason doesn't have to do with technology, but, rather, 
with the ways in which the works in question are designed in terms of 
structures, formal and otherwise, styles, and ease of communication. 
Avant,garde works are not designed for mass consumption. They are 
enigmatic or mysterious - indeed, designedly so - to the average 
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consumer, unJe he or she has a cerrain background compri in.g · me art 
historical knowledge about the context in which the work of arr i made. 
and some operational understanding of the kinds of associati n . modes of 
inrerpretation, and reasoning that are appropriate to bring ro bear on rhe 
work. Avanr-garde works are challenging or, as Clemenr Greenberg puts ir 
_ "difficult"- and, in order co meet their chaUenge, one typically needs 
some knowledge of relevant background frameworks. Since many people 
lack such background frameworks - which, even when known, may be 
difficult to apply - avant-garde artworks are not accessible to wide 
numbers of people. Moreover, since said background frameworks may not 
always be straightforward in terms of their application, avant-garde 
artworks are often not readily accessible in the sense that they are not 
easily deciphered, even when one has access to the background frameworks.H 
In the world as we know it (as opposed to a world in which everyone is 
steeped in the dialectics of the avant-garde), avant-garde art, even if 
produced and delivered by a mass technology, cannot be said to be designed 
for mass consumption, because it is not accessible to large numbers of 
people without training and it is not easy to assimilate. The fact that 
avant-garde art is not easy to assimilate is perhaps signaled by its very 
name - it is in advance of the main body; it is the leading edge, leaving 
many of the rest of us behind. 
But if avant-garde art produced by mass media is not des·igned for mass 
consumption, it may nevertheless provide valuable clues about what is 
involved in eliciting mass consumption. 
Obviously, mass consumption involves accessibility. As the case of 
avant- garde art indicates, in a negative way, accessibility is partly a 
function of background knowledge. In order for mass art to be accessible in 
this sense, it mU1st be designed for fast pickup by untuwred audiences. That 
is, mass art has to be comprehensible for untrained audiences, virtually on 
the first go-around. So the modes of communication and the conventions 
of mass art have to meet certain design considerations, viz., they have to be 
such that they can be grasped and understood almost on contact. They 
must be very, very user-friendly. 
For example, commercial movies and TV typically tell stories by means 
of pictorial representation. Furthermore, there is a large body of psycho­
logical argumenrtation to the effect that pictorial recognition is, in large 
measure, an innate capacity, activated in the process of learning to 
recognize objects. That is, pictorial recognition arises in tandem with 
object recognition. A child, for instance, is able to recognize the subject of 
any picture, where, antecedently, the child is already able to recognize the 
real-world referent of said picture. Pictorial recognition does not involve a 
process of learning over and above object recognition. It does not involve 
training in a code, a language, or procedures of inference. Anyone can 
recognize the referent of a typical motion picture image simply by looking, 
without the intervention of a subtending process of reading or inferring. 
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Thus, insofar as movies and TV images rely heavily upon pictorial symbols, 
they are virtually immediacely acce sible to untutored audiences.;..i 
Storytelling by pictures, that is, expeditiously satisfies one of the major 
desiderata of mass an design, insofar as it guarantees virtually immediate 
pickup by audiences, without chose audiences requiring education in 
specialized codes of reading or inferential procedures. Since pictorial 
representation is accessible to anyone, the mass arts, that are based upon 
chem, have, in principle, a potentially unlimited audience. 
Of course, this is not to say thac the mass arts don't educate audiences 
in how to receive them. Often chis education proceeds, as critics of mass 
art have observed - but misunderstood - by repetition and formula. 
That is, what critics condemn as a failing of mass art is actually a design 
feature which ensures that people will be able co understand mass art by 
becoming familiar with its formulas and conventions. Moreover, the 
formulas and conventions towards which mass art gravitates are not ones 
that must be learned by prior exposure, but ones that almost always can be 
picked up on first exposure. Further exposure to such formulas and 
conventions by repetition serves, then, to make the productions of mass 
art more and more intelligible to audiences. 
Whereas avant,garde arc is frequencly - perhaps, most frequencly - a 
matter of subverting people's expectations (often through the so,called 
deconstruction of formulas and conventions} ,  mass an proper is a matter 
of building and reinforcing audience expectations by means of repetition 
and formula. Moreover, where it makes sense to call the audience 
"trained" with respect to mass culture, the training, in the main, has 
proceeded through the repetition of already fairly accessible formulas. 
Mass arc is designed to be accessible in the sense that it is, ideally, as 
close as possible to being legible to the average, untutored audience 
member, virtually on contact. This, at least, is the ideal toward which mass 
art gravitates. This implies that the mass artwork is designed for easy 
consumption. Moreover, not only is mass art designed for ease of compre, 
hension and consumption in the first instance. It is easy to follow and 
understand in every instance thereafter. 
This ease of comprehension has its origin in the design features of mass 
art. For example, the narrative structures deployed in the mass market 
novels of Stephen King proceed by encouraging audiences to entertain 
certain questions which the novels then go on to answer. This question/ 
answer format - which I call erotetic narration 35- has a kind of natural 
logic which is easy to follow in contrast to the narrative structure of a 
modernist work like Last Year at Marienbad, which presents a barrage of 
questions that are never decisively answered. Because of design features, 
like erotetic narration, the products of mass art are easy to follow, whereas 
examples of modernist art are not. 
Clearly, the accessibility of mass art also is connected with its reliance 
on the formulaic and on repetition. For when I pick up a work of mass art, 
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J ic m,·olves a narraove, then. m c often, I "ill have a precry rd1able 
hori:.on of expectations about the course or trajectory that the events in 
che cory are likely co rake. As cnocs of ma · an have noted. \\ith ma -
narratives, we know which characrers are rhe ones rhac we'll be! hearing 
abouc for che rest of che tory, and we know, pretty reliabl ·, which charac; 
rers are likely to be ali,·e by che end of the story, which ones are likel · to be 
married, and so on. Moreover, we have reliable knowledge of these things 
because mass narratives are formulaic. 
Insofar as mass artworks are formulaic, they are easy to follow, i.e., they 
accord with our expectations. And, insofar as mas artworks are easy to 
follow, they are also apt to appeal to more and more people a suitable or 
appropriate objects with which to occupy one's leisure. 
Of course, in order co command large audiences, mass artworks must be 
more then merely easy co consume. They muse also invite or excite 
interests. But a precondition, here, of exciting interest, is nevertheless that 
they be easily comprehended. 
So again, in a cenain respect, critics of mass art, like Clement Greenberg 
were right. Mass art is easy, especially when compared to the difficulty -
perhaps, the self;imposed difficulty - of avam;garde an. However, the ease 
with which mass art is consumed is not a flaw, but rather a design element, 
which is predicated on the function of mass art as an instrument for 
addressing mass audiences. 
Whether this ease of comprehension implies chat the consumer of mass 
arc is passive is another question. Its answer depends upon how one defines 
"passive." Is the reader of a mystery story, who is informed of the formulas 
of detection fiction, passive when she tries to infer the identity of the 
criminal? That is, it is not exactly clear whether the contrast between easy 
comprehension versus difficult comprehension maps neatly onto the 
dichotomy between passive reception versus active reception. Neverche; 
less, it is the case that we can say from a factual point of view - without 
drawing any evaluative conclusions - that, all things being equal, a work of 
mass arc will be designed for easy comprehension, i.e., for access by large 
numbers of untutored consumers, expending a minimum amount of effort, 
in order to understand the mass artwork. 
Moreover, contra the excoriations of the critics of mass arc, this feature 
of mass art is not a source of shame. le is a condition for the possibility of 
mass arc in the world as we know it. For if mass arc were not expressly 
designed for easy access - i.e., for intelligibility on the part of a maximum 
number of people with minimum effort - it would not be able to command 
mass audiences. 
What earlier critics of mass art saw as a reason to condemn mass art -
its easy accessibility (which in some ways derives from it tendencies coward 
the formulaic) - is in fact a central design feature of mass art, properly so 
called. For without this ease of accessibility for untutored audiences, mass 
art ,could not function to secure or elicit mass consumption. Furthermore, 
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unless one can provide some reason wh · elicinng ma' consumptton m the 
world as we know it LS alway , in principle, condemnable, then the fact 
that mass an is designed for ma con umption hould nor pre em u wlth 
any conspicuous problem. 
Summarizing these ohservanon , then: 
x is a mass artwork if and only if I )  x is an artwork 2) produced 
and distributed by a mass delivery technology 3) which is 
intentionally designed co gravitate in its scructural choices 
(e.g., its narrative forrru, symbolism, intended affect and, 
perhaps, even in irts content) toward those choices which 
promise accessibility with minimum effort for the largest 
number of untutored (or relatively untutored) audiences. 
Here, the parenthetical qualification concerning "relatively untutored 
audiences" is meant to accommodate the fact that, to a certain extent, 
audiences may be tutored by the repetition of the formulas of mass art 
itself. 36 
The second condition of this definition - that the mass artwork is 
produced and distributed by a mass delivery technology - is putatively 
derived from the insight that what everyone is always talking about in the 
debates thac have raged in our culture since the nineteenth century under 
various guises - such as the debate between high art and low art or the 
conflict of serious art versus popular art - has really been concerned with 
mass art, the art that began to appear and which increasingly appears in 
the age of mass industrial society via the agency of mass technology. Mass 
art is art that is produced and distributed by a mass delivery system, the 
first of which to emerge was printing, which was later followed in rapid 
succession by photography, sound recording, motion pictures, radio, and 
television, and which undoubtedly will be augmented by laser technology, 
holography, HDTV, computer technology and who knows what. 
By identifying mass art in terms of mass delivery systems, a distinction is 
drawn between mass art and the more generic notion of popular art. Mass 
art is popular art, but a noteworthy subspecies, distinguished by its reliance 
upon mass delivery systems. 
But what is a mass delivery system? Walter Benjamin suggests that it is 
a technology for the mass reproduction of images and stories. But this is 
not exactly right. For one;time radio broadcasts should also count as 
productions distributed by mass delivery systems, even though they may 
never be reproduced. So, in contrast to Benjamin's notion of mass repro; 
ducibility, I propose to define a mass delivery system as a technology with 
the capacity to deliver the same performances or the same object to more 
than one reception site simultaneously. 
The frescoes on the ceilings of Renaissance cathedrals, though they 
might be viewed simultaneously by large numbers of people, are not cases 
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of mass art. for such frescoe cannot be in rw or more place at che same 
rime. r On che other hand, the self-_ame radio performance- or live-TV 
performance has the capacirry co be tran �mined co many disparate recep­
tion sires; while films and phoc are objects that can be reproduced 
multiply, and transported co many different place . affording, thereb •, the 
possibility that effectively exact rokens of the film-type or photo-C)-pe in 
question can be consumed simultaneous!•. 
Ontologically, the mass artwork is a type, whose numerically distinct 
tokens are identical in the sense chat two dimes of the same minting are 
identical. Moreover, a mass artwork, such as a film, differs from a play. 
which, in certalin respects, is also a type, insofar as different tokens of a 
play, i.e., different productions are not identical insofar as they will enlist 
nonidentical casts, sets, and so on. And this, of course, is why plays are not 
au comatically cases of mass art; for identical productions of them, if they 
are not filmed or taped, cannot be delivered to two or more disparate 
reception sites simulataneously.38 
Previously I claimed that Novitz's argument that mass art has no 
inainsic, distinguishing features overlooked certain alternative options for 
characterizing i!ts distinctive features. The notion that mass art is art 
produced and distributed by a mass delivery system is such an alternative. 
Call it a necessary, srrucrural feature of mass art. Moreover, this feature 
commands our attention once we try to differentiate the kind of art people 
are attempting to characterize in debates about contemporary art. For the 
connection with mass delivery systems is what differentiates the relevant 
popular arr of our times form popular art construed ahistorically. 
However, though production and distribution via a mass technology 
partially differentiates mass art from other sorts of art, it does not tell the 
whole story. For mass art is designed to elicit mass consumption and, 
though being produced by a mass medium makes this possible, in one 
sense, it is not, in and of itself, enough to discharge the function of 
engaging mass audiences. For avant,garde art can be produced and 
distributed via a mass medium, but avant,garde art is typically designed to 
frustrate or problematize mass consumption. 
Thus, identifying mass art with art produced in a mass medium does not 
yield a full account of mass art proper. For a full account of the nature of 
mass art proper is a matter of saying in virtue of what features mass art 
fulfills the function of engaging mass audiences. So, a full account of the 
nature of mass art must provide some indication of how art produced in a 
mass medium is designed to command the attention of mass audiences. 
And, it is the third condition in my theory that is supposed to supply an 
indication of the design considerations that ideally enable mass art to fulfill 
its function. 
Mass art is differentiated from the more amorphous category of popular 
art in terms of mass delivery technologies. Furthermore, mass art is 
differentiated from other forms of art that exploit mass delivery systems in 
18
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 23 [1992], No. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol23/iss1/5
2 2 • 'oel Carroll 
virtue of the functional tendency of mass art to gravirace roward choice of 
devices, srrucrures, affects, and even conlenrs which promi e easy acce i· 
bility with minimum effon for the large r number of unrutored audience .JS 
Earlier, I suggested that my account of mass art might supply a hypoth­
esis for empirical research. What I had in mind is tha1t if one accepts my 
account of mass an, chen one way in which to isolate and analyze central 
elements of mass art will be to explore the ways in which those elements 
facilitate accessibility by large, untutored audiences expending minimum 
effort. For example, one might analyses che ways in which certain devices 
of mass movie narration and TV narration - such as point-of-view editing 
- are keyed to innate dispositions of primate perception.+c For obviously, 
where the devices of mass an mobilize innate responses, their reception by 
mass audiences are virtually guaranteed. 
Of course, I do not mean to suggest that alJ of the cenrral structures of 
mass art are connected to hard-wired features of the human organism. 
Some may be, and in those cases, it is theoretically valuable to take note of 
them. In other caes, the accessibility of the central devices of the various 
mass arts may require amplification in terms of historical and cultural 
considerations. 
For example, the convention of the "fade-out" and its virtually immedi­
ate recognition by audiences would not be explained in terms of innate 
perceptual dispositions of the human organism, but in terms of the way in 
which this convention expanded upon techniques - such as dimming the 
lighting and dropping the curtain - that were already known to audiences 
familiar with these theatrical markers for scene endings. That is, the 
intelligibility and accessibility of the "fade-out" would be explained in 
virtue of an historical transposition of pre-existing practices rather than in 
terms of exclusively hard-wired perceptual capacities. Nevertheless, 
whether the explanations depend on biologicaJ, psychological, social, or 
historical factors, or upon a mix thereof, an unavoidable avenue of 
empirical research into the phenomenon of mass art is the isolation and 
characterization of the structures that secure its accessibility. 
Moreover, as I suggest parenthetically in condition 3, mass art may not 
only gravitate toward certain formal features for the sake of their accessi­
bility; mass arts may also gravitate toward the exploration of certain 
generic affects - such as teenage love as enshrined in endless popular songs 
- because they are commonly recognized by mass audiences. 
Indeed, even the narrative content of mass art may be chosen because 
of its accessibility. Action/adventure stories are undoubtedly particularly 
serviceable for the purposes of mass art because action stories with their 
premium on problems and solutions - often practical solutions achieved by 
physicaJ means - are more immediately intelligible to broadly undiffer­
entiated, generaJ audiences than are stories that require complex social or 
technical know-how. That is, it is easier for the average moviegoer to 
comprehend how a kick-boxer fights his way out of an ambush than it is to 
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comprehend the intricate and crafty financial maneuvering of leveraged 
corporate takeover . or rhe behavi r of pe ple \\ith infinitely subtle exual 
preferences. 
In my criticisms of �ovir:' elimination cheorv, I que tioned whether his 
denial of the relevance of formal and affecrh·e properties for the purpose )f 
identifying mass an was too ha ry. Now perhap the ba is for my su picion 
is e,·idenc. The third condition in my theory implie that fom1al and 
affecrh·e faccors do have a role co play in identifying mass an. Ma an is, 
in part, a functional conceplC. The intended function of mass arc is co elicit 
mass engagement. Thus, mass arr \\ill gravitate co fom1al and affective 
choices that facilitate the function of ma art. We may nm be able to 
draw up a list of che formal features of mass art. However, chis does not 
mean chat formal fearures are irrelevant co identifying mass art. For given 
an artwork produced and distributed by a mass delivery system, we will 
count ic as an instance of mass art only if its formal features, whatever they 
might be, are conducive co mass accessibility. 
Proleptically, lee me point out that in my view mass arr is such that it is 
designed to promote mass accessibility. This concedes that something may 
be an instance of mass arc even if it fails to promote mass accessibilry. A 
production may be a work of mass arc even if it is a bungled attempt - char 
is, as a result of ineptitude, something that is inaccessible. But , on my 
view. as long as it can be established chat the work in question was 
int,entionally designed to be generally accessible, even if it is not, it still 
counts as a work of mass art. 
Also, I claim that works of mass an gravitate toward formal choices that 
enhance accessibility. This language allows that accessibility is a degree 
concept, and that establishing whether a given. formal choice is co be 
assessed as accessible or inaccessible will depend upon judgement calls 
based upon reflecting on comparisons and contrasts between a candidate 
strategy and alternative strategies of construction that are available within 
the same historical context. 
Throughout my discussion of the formal/functional differentiae that 
demarcate mass art, I have repeatedly used avant,garde arc - specifically 
avanc,garde art produced via mass media - as the pertinent logical contrast 
to mass art proper. By mobilizing this contrast - i.e., by asking what is the 
difference between art produced in mass media (such as avant,garde art) 
and mass art proper - I put myself argumentatively in the position to 
hypothesize the third condition of my theory of mass art. 
However, it pays to note that avant,garde art is not only a conceptual 
foil to mass art proper. It is also, I believe, the relevant historical form of art 
which contrasts with mass art. Throughout the various debates that have 
been staged about mass art im this century, critics of mass art have consis, 
tendy disparaged mass art because of its failure to measure up to the 
standards of avant,garde art. Critics of mass art - like MacDonald, 
Greenberg, Collingwood, Ortega Y Gasset, Adorno and Horkheimer -
20
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 23 [1992], No. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol23/iss1/5
24 Noel Carroll 
have all been proponents of avanr,garde arc, and che feature of mass an 
that lead them to consign it co the realm of pseudo,arc are really features 
that derive from the brutal fact that mass an is not avanc,garde art, where 
the notion of avant,garde art itself is generally bound,up with some 
misunderstanding of Kantian aesthetics. Moreover. since avanr,garde an 
has the best claim to being the high art of our epoch, it is easy to see why 
many commentators mi.sdescribe the contrast between avanr,garde an and 
mass art in terms of a distinction between high art and popular art. 
Mass art and avant,garde art, in our times, I hypothesize, have devel, 
oped in contrast to each other, and, historically, the most imponant 
boundaries in the contemporary conception of the arts have to do with the 
way in which they carve up much of the genus of art into two highly 
visible, contrary species. This is not to say that there are not other sorts of 
art existing at present, including, perhaps, what is called middle,brow an, 
and even some authentic folk art. Nonetheless, the highly structured 
distinction between mass art and avant,garde art marks the most signifi, 
cant theoretical boundary between the arts in contemporary W estem 
culture.41 
This discussion of the contrast between mass art and avant,garde art 
will undoubtedly remind the reader that the first condition in my theory 
requires that the mass artwork be art. I have not argued for this condition, 
supposing that it is obvious that a mass artwork must be an artwork. What 
else would it be? 
But this answer, I predict, may displease many. For the case seems 
rigged. Couldn't I have initially oriented my project in terms of attempting 
to identify something called mass cultural productions? And certainly mass 
cultural productions, like network news shows, are not obviously all artworks. 
Thi:s is true. But the realm of mass cultural productions represents a 
larger class of things than I am, at present, prepared to theorize. I expect 
that much of what I say about mass artworks will pertain to mass cultural 
productions in general. But for the present, my target is narrower; I am 
concerned to identify only those mass cultural productions that are 
connected to recognizable artforms, such as painting, sculpture, music, 
drama, dance, literature, and, to a certain extent, architecture. I see no 
problem, in principle, in attempting to characterize this subset of mass 
cultural production, even if some of my findings may apply to other sorts of 
mass cultural productions - that is, to mass cultural productions other 
than mass artworks. 
Of course, the remaining problem that many may find with my theory is 
that I have not provided the reader with any way in which to identify art. 
Nevertheless, we do have theories about the way in which to identify art; 
indeed, I myself have developed such a view.42 So at this point in the 
dialectic, I shall refer you to those theories, should you wish to know how 
to determine whether a candidate for membership in the class of mass 
artworks is an instance of art. And, if you remain unhappy with all of the 
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a,·ailable theones andtor approaches for identi fying art. let me conjecture 
char whatever theory of idenctf)ing art that wins out in the long run will be 
serviceable for the purposes of apphing my theor"\' of mass arr.�' 
N. Fiske's Rejection of the Concept of Mass Art 
I have already noted that many practitioners of what is called cultural 
studies, like Bran tlinger and Ross, find the notion of mass art distasteful. 
Bue if it is simply a matter of distastefulness, then I think that my com­
ments about che numerical sense of mass art should allay their worries. 
However, there is one theorist of cultural studies who appears to believe 
chat the notion of mass arr is not only distasteful; it is metaphysically 
impossible And, of course, if such a view is convincing, then my theory of 
mass art must be wrong. For one should be willing to abandon any theory 
of something that doesn't exist. 
In his Underscanding Popular Culture, John Fiske writes: 
What popular culture is not, however. is mass culture. Mass 
culture is a cerm used by those who believe chat the cultural 
commodities produced and distributed by the industries can be 
imposed upon the people in a way that irons out social differ­
ences and produces a unified culture for a passive, alienated 
mass audience. Such a process, if it existed and it does not, would 
be anticultural and antipopular; it would be the antithesis of 
culture understood a.s the production and circulation of 
meanings and pleasures, and of the popular as an intransigent, 
oppositional, scandalous set of forces. There is no mass 
culture . . .. +. 
Fiske comes to this conclusion about mass culture, and, presumably, 
about mass art, because he has a very special theory of popular culture. 
Ordinarily, we think that popular culture is comprised of objects, like 
books and toys, and mass,produced events, like TV miniseries. That is, 
ordinarily, we think of popular culture and popular art from the produc, 
tion/distribution side of things. And, this leads us to think of popular art as 
a collection of cenain types of products, namely those designed for popular 
consumption. 
But Fiske thinks of popular culture differently - not from the producer's 
side of things, but from the audience's side. Popular culture is something 
that the people, so-called, do, and, not something that the culture industry 
produces. 
Indeed, popular culture is something that people do with the commodi­
ties that the so,called culture industry produces. Popular culture comprises 
the ways in which the people use these products for their own purposes -
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which uses are at variance with the uses intended by the dominant 
ideology and are, therefore, at least in chis sense, oppositional and even 
generally progressive politically (though not radical politically) .  
For Fisk.e, popular culture is, by definition, a site of resistance. Aborigi­
nes, for example, may use westerns for their own purposes ;they cheer at 
the slaughter of white seeders as their wagon trains are surrounded by 
lndians.45 This, of course, is at variance with the intentions of the produc­
ers of the westerns in question, who undoubtedly anticipated that audi­
ences would be horrified by the massacre of the white settlers. But the 
aborigine audience has, so to speak, recoded such scenes as occasions for 
celebrating setbacks to white imperialism. Fiske calls chis type of cultural 
resistance to the inrended point of such westerns producerly (undoubtedly 
alluding tO, while freely adapting, Roland Barthes's distinction between the 
readerly and the writerly46). That is, the a·borigines use the relevant 
commodity in a way in which it was not intended to be used; they produce 
an alternative "meaning" for the scene that is important for the aborigine 
community and its interests. 
People not only resist the commodities of the culture industry by 
producing alternative significance for said commodities. They may also 
purportedly use the commodities of the culture industry to evade the 
disciplinary regimes of the dominant ideology. Fiske cites wrestling 
programs as. an example of the evasion of the dictates of the dominant 
ideologyY For the audience of wrestling programs supposedly celebrates 
grotesque body types that are putatively in violation of the norms of the 
dominant ideology - i.e., Andre the Giant is no one's idea of the ideal 
model for Armani tailoring. Likewise, adolescents who loiter in shopping 
malls, buying nothing, evade, subvert, and putatively resist the imperatives 
of consumer society by eschewing its norms of conduct.48 
Whether or not these examples are persuasive, they nevertheless give 
us a sense of how John Fiske conceives of popular culture. Popular culture 
is a particular kind of use that a certain group - called the people (as in 
"the people, united, will never be defeated") - make of industrially 
produced commodities and their venues of distribution. The relevant kind 
of use in this regard is resistant or oppositional. That is, popular culture is 
the use of commodities by the people in ways, either producerly or evasive, 
that vary from those intended by the culture industry's technocrats and 
which alternative uses, in turn, serve the purposes of the people. 
Stated schematically, Fiske's theory of popular culture is: 
x is an instance of popular culture if and only if 1)  x is a use of 
a commodity by and for the people that is either 2) producerly 
or 3) evasive, and which is 4) relevant to the everyday lives 
(and struggles) of the people. 
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Speaking diagnostically, it is evident how Fiske came co this view. 
Reacting to the Althusserian approach to cultural studies. 4� which seemed 
co entail that resistance to the operation of the ideology communicated by 
the products of the popular culture indusrry was impossible. Fiske set out 
in the exactly opposite theoretical direction. H Althusserians ap�ared to 
provide no theoretical accommodation for the fact that people were not 
always invariably positioned by pop culture (conceived of as what 
Althusserians called an "ideological state apparatus") Fiske responds by 
reconsrruing popular culture as nothing but a site of resistance to the 
dominant ideology. 
Surely, as I myself have argued,x' the Althusserian viewpoint is flawed, 
insofar as it entails that people are incapable of rejecting the ideology 
communicated through popular culture. But this flaw is an empirical flaw; 
ii( doesn't square with the facts. Yet, it is not clear that moving, as Fiske 
does, to a position that is the polar opposite of Althusserianism - has much 
to recommend it. empirically, either. Surely the empirical point to make 
against an Althusserian approach to popular culture is that sometimes 
people resist the ideological address implicit in popular art. But Fiske 
opposes Althusserianism by maintaining that people are almost always 
resisting the ideological address of the products of the culture industry. 
And this seems no more likely, empirically, than the view that they are 
never res1sting the ideological address of the produces of the culture indusrry. 
Of course, when one looks closely at Fiske's theory of popular culture, it 
becomes apparent, almost immediately, that Fiske's theory is not an 
empirical theory. Popular culture is always a site of resistance - of either 
the producerly or the evasive variety - as a matter of definition, rather 
than as a matter of fact. 
Funhermore, popular culture and popular art cannot be reconceived as 
mass culture or mass art in the ways I propose, because of the manner itn 
which Fiske defines the popular. For the popular, according to Fiske, is a 
matter of the resistant usages to which commodities are adapted, whereas 
mass art, in my sense, refers to products structured in a certain way. 
Moreover, since my conception of mass art presupposes that the products 
of mass art are often successfully designed to elicit convergent responses 
form large numbers, even massive numbers, of people, there is no place for 
my version of mass art in the universe as stipulated by Fiske's definition, 
since in that universe, when it comes to popular culture, all is difference -
different uses and meanings that the people find to answer to their own 
purposes and needs in their situated struggles with the hegemonic ideology. 
But, if the issue is really a matter of definition, let us ask whether Fiske's 
definition is a good one. I cannot see that it is. Whether or not you agree 
with my contention that popular art is better conceived in terms of mass 
art, and, for that matter, that popular culture is nowadays better under, 
stood as mass culture, we nevertheless, probably, pretty much agree upon 
what falls into the categories of popular culture and popular art. Will 
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Fiske's definmon of popular culture coincide w1th our pretheor�ncal 
intuitions about the extens10C1 of the concept of popular cul cure? I doubt it. 
Presumably, we all agree char Amon von Webern' atonal mu 1c LS noc 
an example of popular culture. Any theory of popular culture rhac mcorpo­
rates a piece by Webern mco rhe category of popular culture urely ha 
something wrong with it. But why can't a piece of Webern' atonal mu ic 
become a piece of popular cul cure for Fi k,e, if it is used by the people for 
purposes of resistance? 
Suppose a rap group plays a recorded election from \¥/ ebern ac a 
concert for the purpose of deriding Eurocentric culture. That is. the rap 
group uses Webern much m the way chat the aborigines used the dying 
white seeder in movies of the western genre. 
Thus, a piece by Webern, say his Fun[ Sacze for string quartet, Op. 5 
( 1909), enters the corpus of popular culture. Bue certainly any theory of 
popular culture that, for any reason, counts this piece as an example of 
popular art or culture is way off the mark. Moreover, if Fiske's definition of 
popular culture is false, and if his rejection of the existence of mass art 
depends solely on this easily contested definition, then Fiske's definition 
poses no threat to my theory of mass art. 
Of course, we should have anticipated that Fiske's definition of popular 
culture would bear little resemblance to the ordinary concept of popular 
culture. For our ordinary concept of popular culture is geared to thinking 
of popular culture as a collection of products, whereas, for Fiske, popular 
culture is comprised of uses or processes, viz., processes of resistance.51 
Thus, if we assess FiskeNs theory as a reconstruction of our ordinary 
concept of popular culture it is bound to fail. 
But perhaps it will be argued that one misconstrues Fiske's theory as a 
reconstruction of our ordinary concept of popular culture. Perhaps, it is a 
revisionist, stipulative definition, one, which like certain scientific stipula, 
tions, should be assessed not in terms of its capacity to track our ordinary 
concepts of things like gold, but in terms of the way in which it abets 
empirical discoveries about the nature of things rather than our concepts 
of things. Fiske's theory may be at variance with received notions of 
popular culture. But we should accept his radical revislion of these notions 
because of the discoveries, notably the empirical discoveries, that his 
revision makes possible. 
Yet, even if we are to regard Fiske's definition as a stipulative definition 
of this sort, I think we still have good empirical reasons to reject it. For the 
research program that Fiske's stipulative definition suggests unavoidably 
distorts the nature of popular culture, rather than revealing it in a new 
light. Fiske's theory is not empirically enabling; rather, it obscures an 
empirical understanding of popular culture. 
Put succinctly: the problem with Fiske's theory is that it is overly and 
unrealistically obsessed with difference. Fiske's theory identifies popular 
culture with responses to the commodities of the culture industry that are 
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ac Yariance with the mcended or anricipated or de-tgned resp ..m es w 
ching like mO\""ie and n· show . co popular .ongs. and adn�rrisemenc •. It 
skew- empirical re earch in the direcnon of always seeking out the 
Ji fforenrial, purariYelv re isranr, re ponse- of the people ro l{he pr xiuccs (1f 
what, i( we are not Fi kean . we Wl uld call "popular culture." For, under 
Fiske' di pensarion, ic i ju r rhe differential re pon es char comprise 
popular culture . 
Bur this is cleark mi guided. People may ha\'e differenri�l respc1nses cc 
che commodirie of the culrure indu try. But ac the ame rime, che\' ofre-n 
have convergent respon e . For example, many of rhe re ponses of Fiske'. 
urban aborgine must coincide perfectly with the re pon e rhac the 
maker of the westerns in que tion intentionally designed their mm·ics co 
elicit. For example, the aborigine recogni:e certain of che characters in 
che film under di cu sion as white ·eerier rather rhan a tree rump· or 
dung beetles or rocks or planets or, even, Indians. The aborigine· could 
not have mobilized their differential, adversarial response, if the · did nor 
already, antecedently embrace the intended meaning of the sequence in 
question - namely, that these sequences represented white settlers being 
massacred . 
A theory of differential responses of rhe sort Fiske endorses, then, 
makes no sense , if one denies that there is a sulb tratum of convergent 
meanings, and recognitions thereof. on the part of even resistant audi­
ences. Insofar as Fiske's theory seems co countenance only differential 
responses - summarily precluding from the purview of theory the relevance 
of convergent responses to what we pretheoretically call popular culture -
Fiske's theory is bound to distort the phenomenon rather than to illumi� 
nate it empirically . 
Fiske's definition of popular culture neither adequately reconstructs our 
ordinary concept of popular culture, not is it an empirically fruitful, 
stipulative redefinition of popular culture. Insofar as Fiske's rejection of che 
existence of mass culture and, by extension, mass art depends upon his 
definition of popular culture, my commitment to the notion of mass art i 
nor threatened by Fiske. For there seems to be nothing backing Fiske's 
definition ocher than his wish chat popular culture be an altogether good 
object (as a Kleinian psychoanalyst might put it). 
Furthermore, if I was correct in maintaining that any empirically 
satisfactory account of popular culture needs to attend to convergent 
responses in audiences - indeed, needs to explain converent responses, in 
general, before differential responses are explored - then my hypotheses 
about mass art have much to recommend them. For I start lby thinking of 
popular art, construed as mass art, in terms of its capacities to elicit 
convergent responses and understandings amongst vast audiences. 
This, of course, is not the whole story. There are undoubtedly some 
examples of resistance to and recodings of mass art of the sort that 
intrigues John Fiske. And these are certainly worthy of investigation. My 
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point is simply that it does not seem plaU5ible to believe there is a much 
resistance and recoding as Fiske in inuace . And , there is - more tmpor­
tantly - a great deal of convergent re ponse of a sort chat Fiske ignore . Nh 
theory of mas art, of course, cracks this convergence with a vengeance. 
Again: this is not the wh.ole story. But it may be a good beginning.'-
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two different reception sites even though they may be in 
greater proximity than two observation points with respect to 
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My reason for noc wLSrung ro count .\1 c. Ru hmore a an 
example of mas art - though undoubtedly it was constructed 
with the intention co accomrnodace large audiences - lS chat IC 
is not the product of a mass delivery sy tern. If one were to 
admit Mt. Rushmore as mass art, then cathedral . palace and 
tourists attractions would be mass arr. but it seems wrong co me 
to think of the Eiffel Tower as mas.s art. Mt. Rushmore, 
conceived as mass art, seems co me to be a slippery, indeed 
treacherous slope. 
One possible counterexample to my conservatism m 
chese matters might be Disneyland. My initial response to a 
case like chis is ro reject it on the same basis that I rejected Mt. 
Rushmore. If Disneyland is mass art, then won't Sc. Peter's and 
Nocre Dame de Paris be mass art as well? 
However, some may feel that there is a worthwhile 
difference to be noticed here. For there may be a sense that 
there is more than one Disneyland, whereas there is nm more 
than one Sr. Peter's . Disneylands can crop up in more than 
one place - not only in California, but in Orlando, Florida, 
and, as rumor has it, possibly even outside Paris. Moreover, 
these Disneylands or Disneyworlds may be cut from the same 
mold, just as MacDonald's Hamburger Arches - a species of 
mass architecture? - are cue from the same mold. And, with 
the proliferation of Disneylands, it may be possible for different 
audiences to experience che same Disneyworld rides in different 
:sites at the same time. 
Nevertheless, despite the pressure that I acknowledge 
that such considerations pose, I am still wary of admitting 
Disneyland into the realm of mass art. Wouldn't any fairground 
apparatus constructed in accordance with a preset design - say 
a wooden, carpentered water slide - then count as mass arc? 
Bue that seems wrong, since mass technology need not be 
essential co the production of such rides. 
38 Some commentators have worried that, given a performance of 
a play before an audience which is simultaneously broadcast 
around che nation, we will have to say that we have two 
artworks - the play enacted before the audience and the broad 
casted play - such chat one is a mass artwork and the ocher is 
not. On the one hand, we can dissolve the apparent incongru­
ity in a great many cases like this by drawing a distinction 
between one artwork and a mere recording thereof. On the 
other hand, if what is broadcast involved editing and changes 
in camera positions such hac we do not feel chat the broad­
casted play should be delegated co the status of a mere 
recording, then I see no problem with admitting that there are 
two artworks here - the live play and the broadcast play - only 
one of which is mass art. For editing and changes in camera 
position and framing do constitute a layer of artistic interpreta­
tion and creativity noc available in the enacted performance. 
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t4 One objecaon ro the emphasu: chat l place n acce ib1litv m 
the defininon of mass an is thac certain fom1 of ma s art mav 
in fact be inacce ible co large �up of people. �h- student:-, 
for example, cell me chat hea\'y metal mu ic t macce·-ible w 
their parents. Indeed, ic may e,·en be pare of che arrracn.on of 
hea,·y mecaJ thac ic be somehow "inacce -iblc" to che older �ec. 
However, l wonder if heavy metal music t reall · 
inaccessible rather chan simply dtStasteful to m · student' 
parenc . They could cercainly comprehend it without 
putting very much mental energy into ir. e\·en if they didn't 
like it. In fact, many of chese parent may ireall · comprehend it, 
and that may be the reason they dislike it. Bue, in any case, the 
question of whether the Lawrence \XI elk generation or rhe folk 
song generation can literally understand Guns'N Roses is 
different chan che question of whether they enjoy chem. even if 
oldsters tend co couch their dislike mi leading! ' in phrase like 
"I just can't understand x." They actually mean "I can't rand x." 
My emphasis on accessibility may also eem to be· at 
odds with che fact char certain mass art is often targeted at 
specialized audiences. For example. on cable TV, rhere is now 
at least one comedy channel. and there have been rumors chat 
a science fiction channel is also in the offing. In my view, mass 
art aims at securing the largest audience possible. But how can 
we square this with the face that some mass art is cuscomi:ed 
for Limited audiences - audiences, for example. with a taste for 
science fiction, on the one hand, or comedy, on the ocher? 
However, granting char mass arc may be molded co serve 
special audience interests should not obscure the equally 
important fact that in terms of basic stylistic choice - of mode� 
of representation and narrative structures - there is nor that 
great a difference between what would be shown on a comedy 
channel and what would be shown on a science fiction 
channel. The Cosby Show is not really that different from Star 
Trek (of either generation) in terms of features like these. Both 
cell different stories but their narrative and visual structures are 
not so different. So even if certain mass arr products are, in 
virtue of their content, tailored to spectators with special 
interests, nevertheless such works still gravitate towClrd 
securing the largest possible audience in terms of their 
fundamental stylistic choices. 
40 See Noel Carroll, ''Toward A Theory of Point-of-View Editing: 
Communication, Emotion and the Movies," forthcoming in 
Poerics Today. 
41 Though I am primarily concerned with mass art of a modern 
vintage - most notably mass art in the industrial age - I am 
also willing to admit that there may be examples, such as 
popular Japanese woodcuts, that meet my criteria of mass art, 
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36 . ·oel Carroll 
bur "'htch predate mdu tnalll.ation. Today. 1t ma\' be chc ca;;e 
thac we especially \·alue uch woodcucs because c:he\' are nm:. 
that we di.Splay chem in our museums of fine an. and that we 
c:reat c:hem as if they were high art. Bur all c:his seems co m� 
compaable wuh the fact chac they are earlv (perhaps m som<:: 
senses even ·rechnologicalh primmve") c:xamples of mass arc. 
Thac we rreac such specimens as high art due co che1r carc1cy 
and/or to their beaury doe not preclude cheir ·cac:u as early 
mass art. Maybe some of our conremporary fashion phocogra­
phy will be created with the ame esteem m che rwenry-fourth 
century. And, in any case, where I mvoke the notion of "high 
an," in the ttechnical sense of coru.emporary high art, I mean ic 
co be underscood in terms of the avant-garde. So even if we 
honorifically creat some popular, preindustria�. Japanese 
woodcucs as high art today, we certainly do noc mean co imply 
that chey are avant-garde art. 
n Noel Carroll, "An, Practice and Narrative," The Morn.st, Vol 7 1 ,  
no. 2 {April, I 988). 
41 The requirement thac the mass artwork be art may play a role in 
dealing with certain rypes of counterexamples. For example, 
the contention that things like Roman tiles and manufactured 
textiles should not count as mass art may be grounded in a 
view that they are noc arc. Of course, in order to defend such 
exclusions, one will ultimacely have to produce and defend a 
view or a theory concerning the ways in which one goes about 
identifying an. 
44 John Fiske, Understmuling Popular Culture, pp 1 76- 1 77. 
45 Fiske, Understanding Popular Culture, p. 25. 
46 See Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1976). 
47 Fiske, Understanding Popular Culture, pp. 82, 102. 
48 Fiske, Reading the Popular, pp. 14, 18. 
-t9' The founding text of this approach is Louis Althusser's 
''Ideology and Ideological Seate Apparatuses," in his Lenin and 
Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
197 1). 
50' Noel Carroll, Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in Contempo, 
rary Film Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 
51 Interestingly, Fiske is ensared in the notorious product/process 
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ambigum· - which beset earlier plul phen. llf an - in a new 
context and in a new wav. Tub problem ma\ h.a,·e �anng n 
the work of ocher proponencs f culrure cudte�. �vond Fu;ke. 
as well. 
(: Vers1ons of chis article were read co the Communicanons 
Department of the Uni\"ersity of Wisconsin at Madison and to 
rhe Soc1ecy for che Philosophic Srudy of rhe Contemporary 
Visual Ans ac the 1 99 1  Eastern Division Meetings of the 
American Philosophical Association. The author has profited 
immensely from audience comments on both occasions. 
I 
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